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Abstract
Measuring risk can be axiomatized by the concept of coherent measures of risk. A risk
environment specifies some individual portfolios’ realization vectors and a coherent measure
of risk. We consider sharing the risk of the aggregate portfolio by studying transferable utility
cooperative games: risk allocation games. We show that the class of risk allocation games
coincides with the class of totally balanced games. As a limit case the aggregate portfolio can
have the same payoff in all states of nature. We prove that the class of risk allocation games
with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of exact games.
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Összefoglaló
A kockázatmérés axiomatizálható a koherens kockázati mértékek koncepciójával. Egy
kockázati környezet néhány egyéni portfólió realizációs vektorát és egy koherens kockázhati
mértéket tartalmaz. Cikkünkben az aggregált portfólió kockázatának megosztását
tanulmányozzuk átruházható hasznosságú kooperatív játékok, kockázatelosztási játékok
segítségével.
Megmutatjuk, hogy a kockázatelosztási játékok osztálya egybeesik a  teljesen
kiegyensúlyozott játékok osztályával. Szélsőséges esetként az aggregált portfóliónak ugyanaz
az értéke minden világállapotban. Belátjuk, hogy az aggregált kockázat nélküli
kockázatelosztási játékok pontosan az egzakt játékok.
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Abstract
Measuring risk can be axiomatized by the concept of coherent measures of risk.
A risk environment speciﬁes some individual portfolios’ realization vectors and a
coherent measure of risk. We consider sharing the risk of the aggregate portfolio by
studying transferable utility cooperative games: risk allocation games.
We show that the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of totally
balanced games. As a limit case the aggregate portfolio can have the same payoﬀ
in all states of nature. We prove that the class of risk allocation games with no
aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of exact games.




Financial institutions are regulated to hold economic capital as a cushion against default.
A regulator determines the institution’s required economic capital by a measure of risk.
Risk measures are also used to calculate portfolio managers’ risk adjusted performance. It
is therefore crucial to measure and as there is usually a diversiﬁcation eﬀect allocate risk
in an appropriate way.
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1We will use the term portfolio when referring to a risky entity (portfolio of stocks
and bonds, ﬁrm, insurance company, bank, etc.). The value of a portfolio might change
due to all kinds of uncertain events. For the sake of simplicity we use realization vectors
of discrete random variables, specifying the portfolios payoﬀ in all states of nature. A
measure of risk assigns a real number to a realization vector. It is the minimal amount of
cash the regulated agent has to add to his portfolio, and to invest in a zero coupon bond
for its risk to be acceptable to the regulator. Coherent measures of risk (Artzner, Delbaen,
Eber, and Heath, 1999) are deﬁned by four axioms: monotonicity, subadditivity, positive
homogeneity and translation invariance. In particular, they include spectral measures of
risk (Acerbi, 2002), for instance the discounted maximum loss. Cs´ oka, Herings, and K´ oczy
(2007b) show that the axioms of coherent measures of risk are compatible with a natural
general equilibrium approach for measuring risk.
When the risk measure is subadditive then the risk of an aggregate portfolio consisting
of many individual portfolios is lower than the sum of the risks of the individual portfolios.
To allocate the whole risk to the subportfolios one has to share the risk diversiﬁcation
eﬀects. Risk allocation is modeled by Denault (2001) with transferable utility cooperative
games. We separate the risk environment specifying the individual portfolios’ realization
vectors and a coherent measure of risk from the derived cooperative game that we call risk
allocation game.
A totally balanced game is a cooperative game having a non-empty core in all of its
subgames. Totally balanced games arise from a wide range of applications. They coincide
with market games (Shapley and Shubik, 1969); also with a special case of market games
with a continuum of indivisible commodities: cooperation in fair division (Legut, 1990);
they are equivalent to a class of maximum ﬂow problems (Kalai and Zemel, 1982a); and
also to permutation games of less than four players (Tijs, Parthasarathy, Potters, and
Prassad, 1984). Moreover, totally balanced games are generated by linear production games
(Owen, 1975), generalized network problems (Kalai and Zemel, 1982b), and controlled
mathematical programming problems (Dubey and Shapley, 1982).
We show that the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of totally bal-
anced games, that is all risk allocation games are totally balanced and all totally balanced
games can be generated by a risk allocation game with a properly speciﬁed risk envi-
ronment. Using linear programming we characterize all the risk environments with the
maximum loss that generate a given totally balanced game.
In many cases the individual portfolios are riskier than the aggregate portfolio. In this
paper we study the limit case when there is no aggregate uncertainty, that is the payoﬀ
of the aggregate portfolio is the same in all states of nature. We show that the class of
risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of exact games
(Schmeidler, 1972). As evidenced by the previous paragraphs, there are many applications
giving rise to the class of totally balanced games. to the best of our knowledge, risk
allocation with no aggregate uncertainty is the ﬁrst application that leads to the class of
exact games.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First we introduce coherent measures of risk,
transferable utility games and risk allocation games. In Section 3 we prove that the class
2of risk allocation games coincides with the class of totally balanced games and investigate
our constructive proof by linear programming. In Section 4 we show that the class of risk
allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of exact games. In
Section 5 we conclude.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Coherent Measures of Risk
Consider the set RS of realization vectors, where S denotes the number of states of nature.
State of nature s occurs with probability ps > 0 and
PS
s=1 ps = 1. The vector X ∈ RS
represents a portfolio’s (ﬁrm’s, insurance company’s, bank’s, etc.) possible proﬁt and loss
realizations on a common chosen future time horizon, say at t = 1. The amount Xs is the
portfolio’s payoﬀ in state of nature s. Negative values of Xs correspond to losses. The
inequality Y ≥ X means that Ys ≥ Xs for all s = 1,...,S.
A measure of risk is a function ρ : RS → R measuring the risk of a portfolio from the
perspective of the present (t = 0). It is the minimal amount of cash the regulated agent has
to add to his portfolio, and to invest in a reference instrument today, such that it ensures
that the risk involved in the portfolio is acceptable to the regulator. We assume that the
reference instrument has payoﬀ 1 in each state of nature at t = 1, thus its realization
vector is 1S = (1,...,1)>. The reference instrument is riskless in the “classical sense”,
having no uncertainty in its payoﬀs. It is most natural to think of it as a zero coupon
bond. The price of the reference instrument, the discount factor is denoted by δ ∈ R+,
where R+ = [0,∞). We adjust the deﬁnition of coherent measures of risk to the discrete
case with realization vectors as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A function ρ : RS → R is called a coherent measure of risk (Artzner et
al., 1999) if it satisﬁes the following axioms.
1. Monotonicity: for all X,Y ∈ RS such that Y ≥ X, we have ρ(Y ) ≤ ρ(X).
2. Subadditivity: for all X,Y ∈ RS, we have ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ).
3. Positive homogeneity: for all X ∈ RS,h ∈ R+, we have ρ(hX) = hρ(X).
4. Translation invariance: for all X ∈ RS and a ∈ R , we have ρ(X+a1S) = ρ(X)−δa.
Acerbi (2002) treats a subclass of coherent measures of risk: spectral measures of risk in
case of discrete random variables with equiprobable outcomes, that is when p1 = ··· = pS =
1/S, as a special case. He assumes that the discount factor is 1. In order to be compatible
with the deﬁnition of coherent measures of risk, we have to multiply his deﬁnition by δ.
The deﬁnition of spectral measures of risk with equiprobable outcomes is as follows.
Let us introduce the ordered statistics Xs:S given by the ordered values of the S-tuple
X1,...,XS, that is {X1:S,...,XS:S} = {X1,...,XS} and X1:S ≤ X2:S ≤ ··· ≤ XS:S.
3Deﬁnition 2.2. Let the outcomes be equiprobable. Consider a vector φ ∈ RS. The





is a spectral measure of risk if φ ∈ RS satisﬁes the conditions
1. Nonnegativity: φs ≥ 0 for all s = 1,...,S,
2. Normalization:
PS
s=1 φs = 1,
3. Monotonicity : φs is non-increasing, that is φs1 ≥ φs2 if s1 < s2 and s1,s2 ∈
{1,...,S}.
Spectral measures of risk are discounted weighted average losses, with non-increasing
weights, with the highest weight on the worst outcome. The weight vector φ is the so-
called risk spectrum, the “attitude” toward risk. In the following we deﬁne an example for
a spectral measure of risk.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let the outcomes be equiprobable and let k ∈ {1,...,S}. The k-expected







The k-expected shortfall is the discounted average of the worst k outcomes. For a
detailed discussion see Acerbi and Tasche (2002).
2.2 Transferable Utility Games
Let N = {1,...,n} denote the ﬁnite set of players. A value function v : 2N → R deﬁned
on all subsets of N satisfying v({∅}) = 0 gives rise to a cooperative game with transferable
utility (game, for short) (N,v). Let Γ denote the set of games with n players. A single-
valued solution concept is a function Φ : Γ → Rn that maps each game to a unique
allocation x ∈ Rn, where xi is the payoﬀ of player i ∈ N. An allocation x ∈ Rn is
called eﬃcient, if
P
i∈N xi = v(N); individually rational, if xi ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N; and
coalitionally rational if
P
i∈C xi ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ 2N. Eﬃcient and individually rational
allocations are imputations, their set is denoted by I. The set of eﬃcient and coalitionally
rational allocations, the core is denoted by C.
Let for each C ∈ 2N, a(C) ∈ Rn be the membership vector in C, where ai(C) = 1
if i ∈ C and ai(C) = 0 otherwise. Let (λC)C∈2N ∈ R+ denote the collection of numbers
λC ∈ R+ for all C ∈ 2N.
4Deﬁnition 2.4. A balanced collection of weights is a collection of numbers (λC)C∈2N ∈ R+
such that
P
C∈2N λCa(C) = a(N). A game is balanced if
P
C∈2N λCv(C) ≤ v(N) for all
balanced collections of weights.
One of the well-known interpretations is that the players can distribute one unit of
working time to any coalition and if each coalition is active during a fraction λC of a unit
of time then the players cannot reach more than v(N), the value of the grand coalition.
Balancedness is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a non-empty core in a transferable
utility game (Bondareva, 1963; Shapley, 1967). See Predtetchinski and Herings (2004) for
the appropriate extension of the concept of balancedness to be necessary and suﬃcient for
non-emptiness of the core in non-transferable utility games.
For a game (N,v) and a coalition C ∈ 2N a subgame vC is obtained by restricting v to
subsets of C.
Deﬁnition 2.5. A game (N,v) is totally balanced if for every D ∈ 2N its subgame vD is
balanced, that is, if for all D ∈ 2N and for all collections of real numbers (λC)C∈2D ∈ R+
satisfying
P
C∈2D λCa(C) = a(D) we have
P
C∈2D λCv(C) ≤ v(D).
In a totally balanced game every subgame has a non-empty core. Let Γtb denote the
family of totally balanced games with n players. An interesting subclass of totally balanced
games are exact games (Schmeidler, 1972).
Deﬁnition 2.6. A game (N,v) is an exact game if for every C ∈ 2N there exists a core
allocation x ∈ C such that x(C) = v(C).
Let Γe denote the family of exact games with n players. Cs´ oka, Herings, and K´ oczy
(2007a) give the following necessary and suﬃcient condition for a game to be exact.
Theorem 2.7. A game (N,v) ∈ Γ is exact if and only if it is totally balanced and over-
balanced.
Deﬁnition 2.8. An overbalanced collection of weights is a collection of real numbers
(λC)C⊂N ∈ R+ such that
P
C∈2N\{D,N} λCa(C) = a(N) + λDa(D). A game is overbal-
anced if
P
C∈2N\{D,N} λCv(C) ≤ v(N)+λDv(D) for all overbalanced collections of weights.
The diﬀerence between balancedness and overbalancedness is that in case of overbal-
ancedness one coalition is forced to exist for a non-positive amount of time (−λD ≤ 0),
which allows players to spend more than one unit of time in the other coalitions.
Convex games are a subset of exact games (Schmeidler, 1972).
Deﬁnition 2.9. A game (N,v) is convex if for all C,D ∈ 2N we have that
v(C) + v(D) ≤ v(C ∪ D) + v(C ∩ D).
Let Γc denote family of convex games with n players. We have that Γtb ⊇ Γe ⊇ Γc.
52.3 Risk Allocation Games
Denault (2001) introduces risk capital allocation problems: Suppose a ﬁrm has n portfolios,
the matrix of their realization vectors1 is given by X ∈ RS×n. The question is how to
allocate the risk of the ﬁrm measured by a coherent measure of risk to the portfolios.
Let X·i denote the i-th column of X, it is the realization vector of portfolio i. Let
Xs· denote the row of X corresponding to state of nature s; Xs,i its element at row s and
column i; and {Xs,i}i∈D the row vector corresponding to state of nature s with elements
i ∈ D. For a coalition of portfolios C ∈ 2N let X(C) =
P
i∈C X·i and Xs(C) =
P
i∈C Xs,i.
Denault (2001) assumes that the nth portfolio equals b ∈ R units of reference instru-
ment: X·n = b1S, but we will consider a more general setting, where Xn can be any
portfolio. Moreover, we separate the risk environment from the induced game.
Deﬁnition 2.10. A risk environment is a tuple (n,S,p,X,ρ), where n is the number of
portfolios, S indicates the number of states of nature, p = (p1,...,pS) is the vector of
probabilities, X is the matrix of realization vectors, and ρ is a coherent measure of risk.
Deﬁnition 2.11. Given a risk environment (n,S,p,X,ρ) a risk allocation game is a game
(N,v), where the value function v : 2N → R is deﬁned by
v(C) = −ρ(X(C)) for all C ∈ 2N, (3)
and ρ({∅}) = 0 by deﬁnition.
A risk allocation game with n players is induced by the number of states of nature,
their probability of occurrence, n realization vectors and a coherent measure of risk. Let
Γr denote the family of risk allocation games with n players. In such a game, according to
Equation (3), the larger the risk of any subset of portfolios, the lower its value.
If the rows of a matrix of realization vectors sum up to the same number then it captures
that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Formally:
Deﬁnition 2.12. A payoﬀ matrix X ∈ RS×n expresses no aggregate uncertainty if there
exists a number h ∈ R such that for all s ∈ {1,...,S} we have that Xs(N) = h.
Let Γrn denote the family of risk allocation games with n players with no aggregate
uncertainty. Obviously, Γrn ⊆ Γr. We ﬁrst study risk allocation games in general, then
with no aggregate uncertainty.
3 Total Balancedness
3.1 Risk Allocation Games and Totally Balanced Games
Denault (2001) proves (Theorem 4) that the family of risk capital allocation problems is
balanced (Deﬁnition 2.4). As a subgame of a risk allocation game is also a risk allocation
game, we can adjust his proof to show that risk allocation games are totally balanced.
1Denault (2001) uses continuously distributed random variables. We adjust his setting to the more
tractable setup with discrete random variables, resulting in realization vectors.
6Proposition 3.1. All risk allocation games v ∈ Γr are totally balanced, Γr ⊆ Γtb.
Proof. Take any risk environment (n,S,p,X,ρ). We show that for any subgame the
induced risk allocation game (N,v) is balanced. Take any coalition D ∈ 2N and con-
sider the subgame vD. Take any collection of real numbers (λC)C∈2D ∈ R+ such that P
C∈2D λCa(C) = a(D). Then by Equation (3), the positive homogeneity and subadditiv-






























X·i) = −ρ(X(D)) = v(D),
where the last line follows from rearranging the summation and using the fact that we have
a balanced collection of weights. Thus the arbitrarily chosen subgame is balanced. 2
Not only is it true that all risk allocation games are totally balanced, but also any totally
balanced game can be generated by a risk allocation game as the following proposition
shows. We illustrate Proposition 3.2and its proof by Example 3.3.
Proposition 3.2. For each totally balanced game (N,v) ∈ Γtb there exists a risk environ-
ment inducing it, so Γtb ⊆ Γr.
Proof. Take any totally balanced game (N,v) ∈ Γtb. Let us zero-normalize v using




It is easy to see that v0 is also totally balanced. Using the singletons with weights one it




v0({i}) ≤ v0(C). (5)
Moreover, for any C ∈ 2N partitioning N into C and N \ C we have that
v0(C) + v0(N \ C) ≤ v0(N). (6)
Using Equations (5) and (6) we obtain that for any C ∈ 2N
0 ≤ v0(C) ≤ v0(N). (7)
The proof is constructive. First we consider the zero-normalized game, then we show
how the construction can be generalized to the original game. Specify the risk environment
(n,S,p,X0,ρ) as follows. Let us introduce a state of nature for all non-empty coalitions
7of N, thus let S = 2n − 1. We label states of nature by C,D ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Let p1 = ··· =
pS = 1/S, and let ρ be the 1-expected shortfall (Deﬁnition 2.3), that is for any X ∈ RS
ρ(X) = ES1(X) = −δX1:S. (8)
For the moment assume that δ = 1. Then for a realization vector X0
·i ∈ R2n−1 Equation
(8) can be rewritten as
ρ(X
0




so ρ simpliﬁes to the maximum loss. The risk environment (n,S,p,X0,ρ) induces the
game (N, ¯ v0). We will show that ¯ v0 = v0. Using Deﬁnition 2.11 we have that for every
C ∈ 2N \ {∅},





For each coalition (state of nature) C ∈ 2N \ {∅} let the row vector X0
C· be such that
{X
0
C,i}i∈C is a point in the core of the subgame vC
0 , and (11)
for all i / ∈ C let X0
C,i = v0(N). (12)
It follows from the deﬁnition of a subgame, from (11), and the eﬃciency of a core
element that for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅}
v
C
0 (C) = v0(C) = X
0
C(C). (13)






since if D ⊇ C then Inequality (14) follows from (11) as we have that for a core element
{X0




C(C) = v0(C) ≤ X
0
D(C), (15)
and if D 6⊇ C then one of the components of {X0
D,i}i∈C is v0(N), and using Equation (7)
Inequality (14) follows immediately. Combining Equations (13) and (14) with Equation
(10) we obtain that ¯ v0 = v0.
It is easy to see that after normalizing back using the realization vectors X·i = X0
·i +
1Sv({i}),i ∈ N, we can conclude that ¯ v = v. After multiplying the components of X by













·3 X·1 X·2 X·3
{1} 0 8 8 -10 11 6
{2} 8 0 8 -2 3 6
{3} 8 8 0 -2 11 -2
{1,2} 1 2 8 -9 5 6
{1,3} 2 8 4 -8 11 2
{2,3} 8 1 0 -2 4 -2
{1,2,3} 2 1 5 -8 4 3
Table 2: Payoﬀ matrices for the zero normalized game and for the original game.
Example 3.3. Consider the following example with 3 players, where we show how a totally
balanced game can be generated by a risk allocation game.
It is easy to see that v is the value function of a totally balanced game and v0 is obtained
by zero-normalizing v. Note that Inequality (7) is satisﬁed by v0.
In Table 2 we have speciﬁed the matrix of realization vectors X0 according to require-
ments (11) and (12). For instance, for C = {1,2} we have that (X0
{1,2},1,X0
{1,2},2) = (1,2)
is a point in the core of the subgame with players 1 and 2, and X0
{1,2},3 = 8 = v0(N).
Assume that δ = 1. It is easy to check that X0 and the 1-expected shortfall generate v0.
The matrix X is obtained by using X·i = X0
·i + 1Sv({i}) for all i ∈ N. As one can verify
the original game v is induced by X and the 1-expected shortfall.
Note that in our constructive proof the statement of Proposition 3.2 is strengthened in
the sense that the family of games induced by risk environments with S ≤ 2n − 1 and the
1-expected shortfall equals the family of totally balanced games with n players, that is any
totally balanced game can be generated by a properly speciﬁed risk environment with the
1-expected shortfall and 2n − 1 (or lower) states of nature. From Propositions 3.1 and 3.2
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. The class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of totally balanced
games, Γr = Γtb.
9Interestingly, Kalai and Zemel (1982b) uses a similar construction to show that a game
is totally balanced if and only if it is the minimum game of a ﬁnite collection of additive
games. A game (N,v) is called additive if there exists a set of real numbers b1,...,bn such
that for every C ∈ 2N, v(C) =
P
i∈C bi. For a collection of games {vt}t∈T the minimum
game is deﬁned by (minvt)(C) = mint∈T vt(C). It is easy to see that the totally balanced
game v in Table 1 is also generated as the minimum game of the additive games generated
by XC·,C ∈ 2N, in Table 2.
3.2 Linear Programming Results
Take any totally balanced game (N,v) ∈ Γtb. Just like in Proposition 3.2 let S = 2n − 1,
p1 = ··· = pS = 1/S and let ρ be the 1-expected shortfall with δ = 1 throughout the
subsection. Whenever we write v is generated by a matrix of realization vectors X we
mean that the risk allocation game induced by the risk environment (n,S,p,X,ρ) equals
v, where the other elements of the risk environment are the ones assumed above.
In Proposition 3.2 the matrix of realization vectors X generating v was constructed
using the core requirement2: for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅}
{XC,i}i∈C is a point in the core of the subgame vC. (16)
The other elements of X were chosen to be suﬃciently large.
In this subsection we investigate Proposition 3.2 by linear programming and charac-
terize all the matrices generating v. We develop the linear programming problem such
that the matrices derived from its optimal solutions (which are vectors) generate v. To
do this we deﬁne the vector ˆ X ∈ RSn by juxtaposing the rows of X ∈ RS×n, that is
ˆ X = (X1·,X2·,...,XS·)> ∈ RSn. We will use the notations ˆ X and X interchangeably,
depending on whether we need a vector or a matrix containing the same numbers. Using








... . . .






containing the membership vector a(C) transposed along the “diagonal” and 0n otherwise.
For a matrix X ∈ RS×n, similarly to Equation (10), for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅} the value
function of the induced risk allocation game (N, ¯ v) is given by
¯ v(C) = min
D∈2N XD(C). (18)
2There we had a zero normalized game, but it is easy to see that after normalizing back the core
requirement is still satisﬁed.
10Let AD(C) denote the D-th row of A(C). For a vector ˆ X ∈ RSn Equation (18) can be
rewritten as for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅}
¯ v(C) = min
D∈2N AD(C) ˆ X. (19)
Equation (19) implies that for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅}
A(C) ˆ X ≥ ¯ v(C)1
S. (20)
We introduce some more notations. Take any game (N,v) ∈ Γ.
































A ˆ X ≥ V
ˆ X ∈ RSn.
The objective function of (Pv) captures the constructive proof of Proposition 3.2, as it is
minimizing exactly the sum of those elements of ˆ X which are used in the core requirement
(16). To put it diﬀerently: we assign a diﬀerent row of X to each coalition of N. Using
Equation (20) it can be seen that the feasibility constraints are the necessary requirements
for v to be generated by the matrix derived from a feasible solution.
The set of optimal solutions of (Pv) is non-empty, since ˆ X = (k,...,k) ∈ RSn is
feasible solution, where k = max{maxC∈2N v(C),0} and the set of feasible solutions is
bounded from below. Let X ∗
v denote the set of optimal solutions of (Pv) and ˆ X∗ ∈ RSn its
elements.
Proposition 3.5. Take any game (N,v) ∈ Γ and any optimal solution of (Pv) ˆ X∗ ∈ X ∗
v.
The optimal value of the objective function E ˆ X∗ equals
P
C∈2N v(C) if and only if v is
generated by X∗.
11Proof.
(⇒) Assume that E ˆ X∗ =
P
C∈2N v(C). It follows from the feasibility constraints that
for every C ∈ 2N \ {∅}
AC(C) ˆ X
∗ = v(C), (23)
and AD(C) ˆ X∗ ≥ v(C), for all D ∈ 2n.
(⇐) Assume that v is generated by X∗ but E ˆ X∗ 6=
P
C∈2N v(C). From the feasibility






Note that minD X∗
D(C) is attained in row C of X∗, otherwise we could decrease the objec-
tive function by substituting the row attaining the minimum for row C. Combining this





D(C) > v(C), (25)
which together with Equation (19) imply that v cannot be generated by X∗, a contradic-
tion. 2
Take any matrix of realization vectors X ∈ Rz×n, where z is a non-negative integer. Let
Y (X) ∈ R(2n−1)×n denote the matrix in which for all C ∈ 2N we have that YC·(X) = XB·,
where B = argminD XD(C). Then we have the following proposition characterizing all the
matrices that generate a given totally balanced game.
Proposition 3.6. Take any totally balanced game (N,v) ∈ Γtb. The matrix of realization
vectors X ∈ Rz×n generates v if and only if ˆ Y (X) is an optimal solution of (Pv), that is
ˆ Y (X) ∈ X ∗
v.
Proof.
(⇒) If X generates v then for all C ⊆ N there exists a state of nature sC such that
XsC(C) = v(C) (26)
and for all s ∈ {1,...,S} we have that
Xs(C) ≥ v(C), (27)
thus ˆ Y (X) is a feasible and optimal solution of (Pv).
(⇐) If ˆ Y (X) is an optimal solution of (Pv) then by Proposition 3.5 v can be generated
by Y (X) and by construction also by X. 2
Take any totally balanced game (N,v) ∈ Γtb. We saw in Proposition 3.2 that v can
be generated by a matrix of realization vectors, say X. Note that X = Y (X) and by
Proposition 3.6 ˆ X is an optimal solution of (Pv), ˆ X ∈ X ∗
v.
We also have the following proposition about the core requirement (16).
12Proposition 3.7. Take any totally balanced game (N,v) ∈ Γtb. For any optimal solution
of (Pv) ˆ X∗ ∈ X ∗
v we have that X∗, the matrix derived from ˆ X∗ satisﬁes the core requirement
(16).
Proof. Take any ˆ X∗ ∈ X ∗
v. For every C ∈ 2N \ {∅}
AC(C) ˆ X
∗ = v(C), (28)
as the feasibility requires that AC(C) ˆ X∗ ≥ v(C), and since by Proposition 3.2 all totally
balanced games can be generated we know by Proposition 3.5 that E ˆ X∗ =
P
C∈2N v(C).
The equalities in (28) together with the feasibility constraints imply that the rows of X∗
contain core allocations of the respective subgames. 2
Propositions 3.7 and 3.6 imply that if a game can be generated by X ∈ Rz×n then
Y (X) satisﬁes the core requirement (16). Thus to generate a given totally balanced game
the rows of the matrix of realization vectors can be permutated and some of them can be
combined, but essentially the core requirement is satisﬁed in all of them.
4 Exactness
In this section we show that if there is no aggregate uncertainty in a risk environment then
the induced risk allocation game is an exact game and all exact games can be generated
by a properly speciﬁed risk environment with no aggregate uncertainty.
Proposition 4.1. All risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty v ∈ Γrn are
exact, Γrn ⊆ Γe.
Proof. Take any risk environment (n,S,p,X,ρ), where X is expressing no aggregate
uncertainty. Using Theorem 2.7 we will show that the induced risk allocation game is
exact, since it is totally balanced and overbalanced (Deﬁnition 2.8). Total balancedness was
shown in Proposition 3.1 for a general risk allocation game. For overbalancedness take any
collection of real numbers (λC)C⊂N ∈ R+ such that
P
C∈2N\{D,N} λCa(C) = a(N)+λDa(D).


































where the last line follows from rearranging the summation and using the fact that we have
an overbalanced collection of weights, thus if i ∈ D then
P
C3i,C∈2N\{D,N} λC = 1 + λD
13and if i / ∈ D then
P
C3i,C∈2N\{D,N} λC = 1. Using translation invariance and positive










X·i) = −ρ(X(N)) − ρ(λ
DX(D)) =
= −ρ(X(N)) − λ
Dρ(X(D)) = v(N) + λ
Dv(D), (30)
thus we have an overbalanced game. 2
Proposition 4.2. For each exact game (N,v) ∈ Γe there exist a risk environment with no
aggregate uncertainty such that the induced risk allocation game equals (N,v), Γe ⊆ Γrn.
Proof.
Take any exact game (N,v) ∈ Γe. We specify the risk environment (n,S,p,X,ρ) induc-
ing a game (N, ¯ v) as follows. Let us introduce a state of nature for all proper subcoalitions
of N, thus let S = 2n − 2. Let p1 = ··· = pS = 1/S, and let ρ be the 1-expected shortfall
with δ = 1. Since v is exact by deﬁnition for all C ⊂ N there exist a core element xC
such that xC(C) = v(C). Construct X ∈ RS×n as follows. Labeling states of nature by
the proper subcoalitions of N let for all C ⊂ N, XC· = xC. Of course XC·(N) = v(N),
thus X is expressing no aggregate uncertainty. By construction we have that for every
C ∈ 2N \ {∅} the value function of the induced risk allocation game (N, ¯ v) is given by
¯ v(C) = min
D∈2N\{∅}
XD(C) = v(C), (31)
thus ¯ v = v. 2
Note that in the proof of Proposition 4.2, v(N) is set in all rows, that is why we need
only 2n − 2 states of nature.
By combining Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. The class of risk allocation games with no aggregate uncertainty coincides
with the class of exact games, Γrn = Γe.
Cs´ oka, Herings, and K´ oczy (2007a) show that if there are less than four players then the
class of exact games coincides with the class of convex games. Using this result Theorem
4.3 can be reformulated as follows.
Theorem 4.4. If there are less than four players then the class of risk allocation games
with no aggregate uncertainty coincides with the class of convex games, Γrn = Γc.
Theorem 4.4 is illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.5. In this example we show how a 3-player convex game can be generated
by a risk allocation game with no aggregate uncertainty. Note that the game in Table
141 of Example 3.3 is not convex since v({1,2}) + v({1,3}) = −4 − 6 = −10 > v({1}) +
v({1,2,3}) = −10−1 = −11. However, as can easily be veriﬁed, by changing v({1,2}) to -5
we get the convex game shown in Table 3. This game is generated by the risk environment
including the matrix of realization vectors X of Table 4 and the 1-expected shortfall with
δ = 1.
Notice that the rows of X correspond to appropriately chosen marginal contribution
vectors. For instance, in the ﬁrst row of X we have the marginal contributions corre-
sponding to the permutation player 3, player 2, player 1: v({3}) − v({∅}) = −2 − 0 =
−2;v({2,3}) − v({2}) = 2 − (−2) = 4;v({1,2,3}) − v({2,3}) = −1 − 2 = −3. Since in
a convex game the marginal contribution vectors are in the core, there are core elements
distributing their value to n coalitions (the increasing subsets of players) at the same time.
Thus to generate a convex game fewer states of nature are required, in this example only
3. Also note that all rows of X sum up to -1, since the sum of the marginal contributions









Table 3: The value function of a convex game v.
S X·1 X·2 X·3
P
Xs,i
1 -3 4 -2 -1
2 -7 3 3 -1
3 -10 5 4 -1
Table 4: A matrix of realization vectors generating v.
Similarly to Proposition 3.6 we can characterize all the risk environments with the
maximum loss that generate a given exact game.
Proposition 4.6. Take any exact game (N,v) ∈ Γe. The matrix of realization vectors
X ∈ Rz×n satisfying no aggregate uncertainty generates v if and only if ˆ Y (X) is an optimal
solution of (Pv), that is ˆ Y (X) ∈ X ∗
v.
Proof. Proposition 3.6 characterizes all the matrices that generate a given totally bal-
anced game. Since by Proposition 4.1 only exact games can be generated with matrices
15satisfying no aggregate uncertainty, the proof is straightforward. 2
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed transferable utility cooperative games derived from a risk
environment: risk allocation games. We have shown that the class of risk allocation games
coincides with the class of totally balanced games. This result makes sure that a regulator
or performance evaluator can always allocate risk in a stable way: there will always be a
core element, no matter how the risk environment is changing.
We have also studied the case when the aggregate portfolio has the same payoﬀ in all
states of nature. We proved that if there is no aggregate uncertainty then the class of risk
allocation games equals the class of exact games, where for each coalition there is a core
element such that the coalition gets only its stand-alone value. This means that if there is
no aggregate uncertainty, then not necessarily everybody beneﬁts from the diversiﬁcation
eﬀects in a stable allocation of risk. To put it diﬀerently, the lower aggregate uncertainty,
the more power the regulator or performance evaluator has in allocating risk, since for each
coalition there is always a stable allocation of risk, such that it gets hardly less than its
stand-alone value.
We have characterized all the matrices of realization vectors that generate a given totally
balanced or exact game. In both cases the vectors derived from the matrices by juxtaposing
their rows are related to the optimal solutions of a linear programming problem.
Denault (2001) shows that if a risk allocation game for an arbitrary matrix of realization
vectors is convex then the risk measure by which it is induced is necessarily additive, thus
the generated risk allocation game is also additive. However, by imposing some structure
on the matrix of realization vectors we have proven the following theorem: If there are less
than four players then the class of convex games coincides with the class of risk allocation
games having the discounted maximum loss, at most three states of nature and no aggregate
uncertainty in their risk environments.
References
Acerbi, C., 2002. Spectral measures of risk: A coherent representation of subjective risk
aversion. Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 1505–1518.
Acerbi, C., Tasche, D., 2002. On the coherence of expected shortfall. Journal of Banking
and Finance 26, 1487–1504.
Artzner, Ph. F., Delbaen, F., Eber, J.-M., Heath, D., 1999. Coherent measures of risk.
Mathematical Finance 9, 203–228.
Bondareva, Olga N., 1963. Some applications of linear programming methods to the theory
of cooperative games (in Russian). Problemy Kybernetiki 10, 119–139.
16Cs´ oka, P., Herings, P. J. J., K´ oczy, L. ´ A., 2007a. Balancedness conditions for exact games.
Manuscript, pp. 1–14.
Cs´ oka, P., Herings, P. J. J., K´ oczy, L. ´ A., 2007b. Coherent measures of risk from a general
equilibrium perspective. Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming,
doi:10.1016/j.jbank.n.2006.10.026
Denault, M., 2001. Coherent allocation of risk capital. Journal of Risk 4, 1–34.
Dubey, P., Shapley, Lloyd S., 1982. Totally balanced games arising from controlled pro-
gramming problems. Discussion paper.
Kalai, E., Zemel, E., 1982a. Generalized network problems yielding totally balanced games.
Operations Research 30, 998–1008.
Kalai, E., Zemel, E., 1982b. Totally balanced games and games of ﬂow. Mathematics of
Operations Research 7, 476–478.
Legut, J., 1990. On totally balanced games arising from cooperation in fair division. Games
and Economic Behavior 2, 47–60.
Owen, G., 1975. On the core of linear production games. Mathematical Programming 9,
358–370.
Predtetchinski, A., Herings, P. J. J., 2004. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the non-
emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game. Journal of Economic Theory
116, 84–92.
Schmeidler, D., 1972. Cores of exact games. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Appli-
cations 40, 214–225.
Shapley, Lloyd S., 1967. On balanced sets and cores. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
14, 453–460.
Shapley, L. S., Shubik, M., 1969. On market games. Journal of Economic Theory 1, 9–25.
Tijs, S., Parthasarathy, T., Potters, J., Prassad, V. Rajendra, 1984. Permutation games:
Another class of totally balanced games. OR Spektrum 6, 119–123.
17Discussion Papers published since 2005
2005
GÁCS János: A lisszaboni folyamat: rejtélyek, elméleti problémák és gyakorlati nehézségek.
MT–DP. 2005/1
PÉTERI Gábor: Igazodás a piacgazdaság szabályaihoz és megfelelés a helyi elvárásoknak – A
városi polgármesterek értékrendje, 2004. MT–DP. 2005/2
SZALAI Ákos: Adóverseny az iparűzési adóban – Az 5000 fő fölötti települések adópolitikája
a 2000-es években. MT–DP. 2005/3
Gábor BÉKÉS – Balázs MURAKÖZY: Firm Behaviour and Public Infrastructure: The Case of
Hungary. MT–DP. 2005/4
Gusztav NEMES: The Politics of Rural Development in Europe. MT–DP. 2005/5
Gusztav NEMES: Integrated Rural Development – the Concept and Its Operation. MT–DP.
2005/6
JUHÁSZ Anikó –SERES Antal –STAUDER Márta: A kereskedelmi koncentráció tendenciái
MT–DP. 2005/7
Hajnalka TARJÁNI: Estimating some Labour Market Implications of Skill Biased
Technology Change and imports in Hungary. MT–DP. 2005/8
L. HALPERN – M.KOREN.- Á. SZEIDL: Import and Productivity. MT–DP. 2005/9
Szabolcs LŐRINCZ: Persistence Effects in a Dynamic Discrete Choice Model – Application to
Low-End Computer Servers. MT-DP. 2005/10
Péter VIDA: A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case. MT-DP. 2005/11
László Á. KÓCZY: The Core Can Be Accessed with a Bounded Number of Blocks. MT-DP.
2005/12
Viktória KOCSIS: Network Asymmetries and Access Pricing in Cellular Telecommunications.
MT-DP. 2005/13
István KÓNYA: Economic Development, Exchange Rates, and the Structure of Trade. MT-
DP. 2005/14
Gábor G. SZABÓ – Krisztina BÁRDOS: Vertical Coordination by Contracts in Agribusiness:
An Empirical Research in the Hungarian Dairy Sector MT-DP. 2005/15
Attila AMBRUS: Theories of Coalitional Rationality. MT-DP. 2005/16
Jin-Chuan DUAN – András FÜLÖP: Estimating the Structural Credit Risk Model When
Equity Prices Are Contaminated by Trading Noises. MT-DP. 2005/17
Lawrence UREN – Gábor VIRÁG: Wage Inequality in a Burdett-Mortensen World. MT-DP.
2005/18
Berthold HERRENDORF – Ákos VALENTINYI: Which Sectors Make the Poor Countries so
Unproductive? MT-DP. 2005/19
János GÁCS: The Macroeconomic Conditions of EU-inspired Employment Policies. MT-DP.
2005/20
CSATÓ Katalin: Egy fiziokrata: Paul-Pierre Le Mercier de la Rivière. MT-DP. 2005/21
2006
Krisztina MOLNÁR – Sergio SANTORO: Optimal Monetary Policy When Agents Are
Learning. MT-DP. 2006/1
András SIMONOVITS: Social Security Reform in the US: Lessons from Hungary. MT-DP.
2006/2
Iván MAJOR - Why do (or do not) banks share customer information?. A comparison of
mature private credit markets and markets in transition. MT-DP. 2006/3Mária LACKÓ: Tax Rates with Corruption: Labour-market Effects. Empirical Cross-country
Comparisons on OECD Countries. MT-DP. 2006/4
György MOLNÁR – Zsuzsa KAPITÁNY: Mobility, Uncertainty and Subjective Well-being in
Hungary. MT-DP. 2006/5
Rozália PÁL - Roman KOZHAN: Firms’ investment under financing constraints. A euro area
investigation. MT-DP. 2006/6
Anna IARA: Skill diffusion by temporary migration? Returns to Western European working
experience in the EU accession countries. MT-DP. 2006/7
György MOLNÁR - Zsuzsa KAPITÁNY: Uncertainty and the Demand for Redistribution.
MT-DP. 2006/8
Péter BENCZÚR - István KÓNYA: Nominal growth of a small open economy. MT-DP.
2006/9
Gábor VIRÁG: Outside offers and bidding costs. MT-DP. 2006/10
Péter CSÓKA - P. Jean-Jacques HERINGS - László Á. KÓCZY: Coherent Measures of Risk
from a General Equilibrium Perspective. MT-DP. 2006/11
Norbert MAIER: Common Agency with Moral Hazard and Asymmetrically Informed
Principals. MT-DP.2006/12
CSERES-GERGELY Zsombor – CSORBA Gergely: Műkincs vagy működő tőke? Gondolatok
a kutatási célú adatok hozzáférhetőségéről. MT-DP.2006/13
Dr. SERES Antal: Koncentráció a hazai kereskedelemben. MT-DP.2006/14
Balázs ÉGERT: Central Bank Interventions, Communication and Interest Rate Policy in
Emerging European Economies. MT-DP.2006/15
Gábor BÉKÉS - Jörn KLEINERT - Farid TOUBAL: Spillovers from Multinationals to
Heterogeneous Domestic Firms: Evidence from Hungary. MT-DP.2006/16
2007
Mirco TONIN: Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence. MT-DP.2007/1
Mihály LAKI: Evolution on the market of foreign language teaching services in Hungary.
MT-DP.2007/2
VINCZE Péter: Vállalatok tulajdonosi irányításának változatai. MT-DP.2007/3
Discussion Papers are available at the website of Institute of Economics Hungarian Academy
of Sciences: http://econ.core.hu